Abstract. We extend a result of Yamashita (Econometrica 2010) to show that every allocation rule supportable by a centralized mechanism designer, including allocations involving correlated actions (and correlated punishments) can be supported as a Bayesian equilibrium outcome function in the competing mechanism game provided the game has four or more players.
In a competing mechanism game, multiple principals design contracts that commit them to actions that are conditional on messages they receive from other players. It is well known that static competing mechanism games can have equilibrium in which principals can support collusive outcomes by using mechanisms which require agents (or any other player with whom they communicate) to communicate market information along with information about their types. This possibility was initially mentioned in McAfee (1993) , however, examples that illustrated this possibility in common agency games were only offered later in Peck (1994) , Martimort and Stole (1998) , or Epstein and Peters (1999) .
A characterization of the contracts needed to support all equilibrium outcomes was provided in Epstein and Peters (1999) . For the special case of common agency, simpler characterizations, again of the set of contracts needed to understand all equilibrium allocations, were provided in Martimort and Stole (2002) , Peters (2001) and Pavan and Calzolari (2009) . Similar attempts to describe a set of indirect mechanisms that can be used to support all competing mechanism equilibrium have been provided in special environments by Han (2006) , and Andrea Attar and Portiero (2008) .
Only recently has the literature focused on the set of allocations that can be supported by equilibrium. The first paper to do this is Yamashita (2010) , who uses something he calls recommendation mechanisms to show how a potentially large set of pure allocation rules might be supported as equilibrium outcome functions with competing mechanisms. Principals write contracts that commit them to carry out an action or implement a direct mechanism if a majority of the agents he communicates with tell him to. Since disagreeing with the majority is never a strictly best reply, he uses this to show how a large set of allocations could be supported as equilibrium in recommendation mechanisms.
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Though Yamashita explains perfectly well how competing mechanisms can be used to support multiple outcomes, he doesn't provide an explicit theorem characterizing supportable outcomes. There are two reasons for this. First, he restricts players to use pure strategies for expositional reasons, so a complete characterization isn't feasible in his setting. Secondly he describes the punishments that define 'min-max' payoff by referring to implicitly defined continuation equilibrium outcomes that are not characterized, and which need not exist under his restrictions. Our primary goal in this paper is to provide this characterization. Our main result is that the set of Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in competing mechanism games is equivalent to the set of outcomes supportable by a centralized mechanism designer who collects information then controls the actions of all the players.
Proving this characterization theorem involves two technical problems that go far beyond the argument in Yamashita. The first is the extension to mixed strategies, the second is to show how to supported correlated outcomes in a game in which players use independent strategies. We borrow a result from the computer science literature, then show how to implement correlation with an indirect mechanism that makes explicit use of the fact that messages are sent sequentially. For complete information games, our results show how the folk theorem like results in A.T. Kalai and Samet (2010) can be extended to arbitrary numbers of players. For games of incomplete information, our characterization involves the usual inequalities associated with incentive compatibility and individual rationality.
The customary way to model competing mechanisms, which the approach that Yamashita follows, is assume that each principal is uninformed and deals with the same set of informed agents. The agents have an interest in the outcome, but take no actions of their own. This is a special case of a situation in which all players in a game are both potentially informed principals and agents at the same time.
2 We use this more general framework here, so our characterization theorem applies to a broader set of environments than is traditionally discussed in the literature. In particular, the extension to informed principals is valuable in problems like collusion Laffont and Martimort (1997) or Che and Kim (2006) ) in which the problem of exactly who offers the collusive mechanism is often an issue. As will be seen, our results provide a characterization of the set of outcomes that can be supported by a group of colluding agents without the intervention of an outside coordinator.
One notable feature of our approach is that we show how to support randomization and correlation of outcome without requiring that players commit to any kind of randomization 3 Part of our argument about this is not new. We borrow methods from the computer science literature (A.T. Kalai and Samet (2010) ) that allow us to convert randomly selected (but ultimately easily verifiable) messages into randomizations over actions. Our main contribution is to add an indirect mechanism that makes it possible for players to correlate their actions without the use of a public correlating device when there are more than two players.
4
The indirect mechanism that we add to achieve correlation is the only new conceptual idea in this paper. We exploit two properties of the competing mechanism environment that aren't typically considered in the existing literature. The first is that principals can communicate with one another after contracts are signed in much the same way agents do. The second is the fact that communication can be sequential, so that communication between a principal and agent in one round of communication can indirectly influence communication between another principal and agent in the second round. We use this to show communication can be used to correlate principals actions in a manner similar to the way that unmediated communication supports correlated equilibrium in games.
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2 To express this in another way, the Yamashita model is a special case of ours in which a subset of players in a game is assumed to be uninformed, while the rest of the players are assumed to have no actions that they control.
3 Random contracts are more than an analytical nuisance since it isn't obvious to verify whether or not a player has carried out a randomization that he has committed to.
4 A.T. Kalai and Samet (2010) already show how to do this for two players. 5 As in (Gerardi 2004) , or (Forges 1990 )for example. The difference here is that principals can commit to the way they respond to messages.
Our model incorporates a broader class of problems than is traditional in the literature on competing mechanisms, since we allow for informed principals. In such a context, it would be very restrictive to prevent principals from communicating with players who possess information that is relevant to their decision. This is why we allow principals to commit based on reports from other principals. Otherwise, we have been careful to use the competing mechanism model that is standard in the literature in the sense that principals base their commitments on messages that are conveyed privately to them by agents, as is the case in each of the competing mechanism papers that have been cited above. We also carefully maintain two common assumptions from the literature -mechanisms do not specify random outcomes, and in the equilibrium that we consider, all players use pure strategies both on and off the equilibrium path. Nonetheless, we are able to show equivalence of equilibrium outcomes in competing mechanism games and outcomes supportable by a mechanism designer who faces no such restrictions.
One special case of our model is the one in which a group of uninformed principals interacts with a group of informed agents who control no actions (as in Yamashita (2010) for example). Our results illustrate just how powerful mechanisms can be in a competitive environment. 
Fundamentals
There are n ≥ 4 players. We sometimes write N to represent the set of players. Player i must choose an action a i from a finite set A i . Let a = {a 1 , . . . , a n } be an array of actions in
Each player i has a privately observed type θ i drawn from a finite set Θ. Payoffs are given by u i : A × Θ n → R. Players have expected utility preferences over actions.
Let P i , P −i , and P be the set of probability distributions on A i , A −i , and A respectively. A typical element p ∈ P is a vector with p k equal to the probability that the k th element in A occurs, where the set A is indexed in some arbitrary fashion.
Let q : Θ n → P be an allocation rule. In what follows we slightly abuse notation by writing u i (q, θ) instead of a∈A q a u i (a, θ). We are interested in allocation rules that are incentive compatible and individually rational. Incentive compatibility means
Perhaps more powerful than is suggested in Yamashita's theorem alone.
for each i ∈ N , and θ ′ i ∈ Θ i . Individual rationality means that for each player i there is a punishment p i :
With complete information, an allocation is individually rational if and only if it provides each player with an expected payoff that exceeds his or her minmax value, defined for player i as
Again, with complete information the punishment
can be used to support all implementable allocations. Notice that when constructing a punishment, or a minmax value, punishers are allowed to correlate their punishments. This is appropriate for a mechanism designer who can enforce contracts and correlate actions among agents who have agreed to participate.
Competing Mechanism Game
Players determine their actions by writing contracts that restrict their actions conditional on messages they (privately) receive from other players. As always, the pair {γ i , M i } is a mechanism for player i with γ i : j =i M i → A i . There is some set Γ of feasible mechanisms.
We presume in what follows that message spaces are always measurable and that this set of feasible mechanism includes the recommendation mechanisms that we describe below. As we illustrate below, the allocations that we characterize are also the only ones that can be supported in equilibrium in any space of mechanisms that contains the mechanisms that we describe below. In this sense we provide a complete characterization.
As mentioned above, we don't use random mechanisms for the characterization theorem we are about to prove, which is why we restrict the mapping to have image in A i instead of P i . However, we are going to exploit the fact that messages are sent sequentially. This is implicit a standard single principal mechanism design problem, since the set of messages is typically broad enough to include strategy rules in an extensive (communication) game. It is also irrelevant, since anything an agent can communicate in a sequential game can also be communicated in one round of messages. A competing mechanism game is different in that the agents are communicating with other principals.
The message that an agent sends at each round of a communication process will typically depend on messages he has exchanged with other players. It is exactly this property that we use to support correlation.
To be specific, we assume the message space M i is a cross product space M i0 × M i1 and that messages in M i0 are sent first. After all the players have observed their first round messages (these are all in M i0 for player i) from all the other players, they send messages in M i1 , which can be conditional on the first round messages they received. We refer to mechanisms in which messages are sent in two rounds as sequential communications mechanisms.
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An equilibrium for the competing mechanism game is a Bayesian equilibrium of the usual sort. The players' strategies specify for each of their types, a mechanism and a rule that specifies the messages they send in each round as a function of the mechanisms offered by the other players, and the messages they received in previous rounds. In a Bayesian equilibrium, each player's strategy is a best reply to the strategies of their others given their beliefs about the other players' types.
We focus on Bayesian equilibrium for a number of reasons. First, it makes it possible to give a simple relationship between equilibrium in the competing mechanism game and Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational allocations that mimics the ones that apply when outside options are exogenously specified payoffs. Our theorem also shows a set of allocations that can be supported as equilibrium relative to any set of mechanisms that contains the recommendation mechanisms we describe. As we explain below, equilibria supported by recommendation mechanisms aren't going to satisfy the most obvious refinements (for example, they typically won't be part of any sequential equilibrium since agreeing with the majority is typically never a strict best reply). So the right refinement is going to depend on details of the game to which the theorem is applied. For this reason we think that committing to a particular refinement here (which may not fit every environment) will only limit the usefulness of the theorem.
Secondly, refinements in competing mechanism games present conceptual issues that go well beyond the discussion in Yamashita (2010) . The competing mechanism paradigm itself rules out most standard refinements. The reason is that the set of feasible mechanisms is typically broad enough that it includes mechanisms for which continuation equilibrium won't exist. For instance, if the set of potential messages isn't finite, a deviating mechanism designer could offer a mechanism that rewards the agent who announces the highest integer. Refinements like subgame perfection or perfect Bayesian equilibrium, both of which impose restrictions on continuation play in all information sets in a game, simply can't exist. We explain some of these problems after we prove our main theorem. Focusing on Bayesian equilibrium means that we don't have to impose vague assumptions about endogenous variables, like assuming that continuation equilibrium exists for all possible arrays of mechanisms. It remains an open question what the appropriate refinement is for competing mechanism games, and what the set of supportable allocations under that refinement look like.
Finally, the right interpretation of the Yamashita theorem is that plenty of stuff can be supported in equilibrium (this paper shows how large this set is) and that finding and motivating restrictions on the contracting environment is the central problem in showing that the competing mechanism approach has empirical content. It is obvious that refinements are going to play a role in this, but particularly how they play a role is a secondary issue.
Theorem
At this point we can state our main theorem: Theorem 1. If there are 4 or more players, then any incentive compatible and individually rational allocation rule can be supported as a Bayesian equilibrium in the competing mechanism game.
It is important to observe the difference between this theorem and Yamashita's theorem. The set of individually rational allocations here has two properties that Yamashita's allocations don't. First, they are defined in terms of inequalities that depend only on fundamentals. It is very straightforward to check for a particular problem how big the set of supportable rules is. Second, note that individually rational allocations as defined here do not depend in any way on what the set of feasible contracts is. Without this property it is impossible to tell whether a particular restriction on the contracting environment will narrow the set of feasible allocations.
There is a sense in which this theorem can be used in a positive way. To explain it, we take a moment to describe the collusion proofness problem. The gist of the idea is from McAfee and McMillan (1992) who imagined a mechanism designer like an auctioneer designing a mechanism while realizing that bidders might want to collude against him. They suggested that the colluding bidders should be subject to the same incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints as the primary mechanism designer. Ultimately, this led to the idea that the primary mechanism designer's mechanism should be designed to rule out the possibility that bidders could themselves designing a mechanism that is at once profitable, but also incentive compatible and individually rational.
One important problem in doing this is to decide who exactly will come up with the mechanism that guides the colluders. Our approach illustrates one possible answer. It suggests that modeling the collusive process as if it were designed by an outside coordinator can be 'decentralized' into a model in which all the potential colluding players can offer commitments. This seems more reasonable in many ways than arbitrarily choosing one of the players and giving them this responsibility.
We now turn to the proof of this result which is completely constructive.
Some Preliminary Ideas.
Our proof combines a number of ideas. We borrow methods from computer science to implement correlated and random outcomes. We then develop a sequential communication mechanism that effectively converts private communication into a public correlating device. We explain each of these methods before we proceed to the theorem. 4.1. Implementing random outcomes with non-random contracts. Let B be a set with K elements indexed in some arbitrary way. Let π be a vector of K probabilities that sum to one. Lett be a random variable uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. The randomizing function α π (·, B) for mixture π on the set on set B is defined by
This randomizing function takes value b k with probability π k . To see how this device will be used, suppose that player i can observe a verifiable random devicet which is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. Then the contract α π t , A i which maps from the randomizing device into pure actions implements the mixture π on A i . More broadly, α π t , A implements joint action a k with probability π k . Let α π i t , A be the projection of α onto A i . If each player writes a contract based ont that commits them to take action α π i t , A , then the set of contracts α π 1 t , A , . . . , α π n t , A implements the joint randomization π.
4.2.
A property of uniform distributions. For any non-negative real number x, ⌊x⌋ means the fractional part of x (sometimes the terminology is x mod 1). Letx 1 , . . . ,x n be a collection of n independent random variables, where eachx i is uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. For n ≥ 2, fixx i = x for some i. Then ⌊x + j =ix j ⌋ is a random variable. This random variable turns out to be uniformly distributed on [0, 1] independent ofx.
8 Since this argument proves very useful below, we give a simple proof.
Remark 2. ⌊x + j =ix j ⌋ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] independently ofx provides eachx j is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
Proof. Suppose that n = 2. Then j =ix j =x j , and ⌊x +x j ⌋ is obviously uniform. Let bothx 1 andx 2 be uniform on [0, 1] . Then the probability density function ofz =x 1 +x 2 is
The probability that ⌊z⌋ ≤ w is then given by
So ⌊x 1 +x 2 ⌋ is uniformly distributed. So when n = 3, ⌊x + j =ix j ⌋ is uniformly distributed. Then the argument follows by induction. If for n − 1 players ⌊x + k =jx k ⌋ is uniformly distributed, then for n players
and uniformity follows from the result for n = 3.
8 This appears to be conventional wisdom in statistics. The theorem is referred to in Deng and E.Olusegun (1990) . A proof that the sum mod 1 of a pair of random variables on [0, 1] is uniform as long as at least one of the random variables is uniform is given in Deng, Lin, Wang, and Yuan (1997) , Theorem 3.1 (see especially the comment after the theorem).
9 (Hall 1927). 4.3. Confirmation Process. Now we describe how we will turn private messages into public messages. There are two issues here -the first is to create a correlating device. Perhaps as important, each player will convey type information to the other players. Since the player's type report must be the same in each mechanism to which he reports, we have to provide some kind of incentive for players to say the same thing to all players. We do this using a 'confirmation process'. Players send messages in the first round, but commit themselves to react only to what other players say about these messages in the second round. In our mechanisms, players will send a type report and a correlating message to each of the other players. These should not vary across players. To understand how we support this, it is somewhat easier at this point to use a single message space space S = [0, 1]. The logic below is the same whether S is the unit interval, or some kind of cross product space.
The process works as follows: in the first round, each player sends each of the other n − 1 players a report from S. At the same time, he receives reports from each of the other n − 1 players, again from S. We are using the conventional approach that player i can base his outcome only on reports that he hears (privately) from each of the other n − 1 players. So at the end of the first round, player i has n − 1 messages that he can use to condition his action.
However, we will have him wait until he hears second round messages. In the second round, each player simply tells player i what messages he received from the other n − 1 players (including player i) in the first round. Each of the other players then sends i n − 1 messages in the second round. This gives i (n − 1) 3 messages that he can use to make commitments.
What we will do is to assume that player i reduces this large set of messages to exactly n messages which he uses to determine his action. For example, i has (n − 1) 3 messages that describe types and what other players reported about everyone elses' type. This jumble of information has to be converted into exactly n type reports. To capture this, we think of a confirmation process as a function from S (n−1)
We adopt the following notation: s i j is the first round message that player i sends to player j. For each i = j, k let t i jk be the report that player i makes to player j about the signal he received from player k in the first round. In this notation t i jj is the report that i makes to j about the signal he received from him.
Definition 3. A confirmation process for player i with message space S takes any array in S (n−1) × S (n−1) 2 into an array in S n according to
In the expression above, the notation ∃! means 'there exists a unique...'. The number τ i j (s −i , t −i ) is the number that i will use about player j when he chooses his action. If j = i and i is looking for 'his own' number, he will check the messages he received in the second communication round from the other players reporting the messages they received from him in the first round. If these all agree, or all but one of them agree, then i will use whatever number they happen to agree to. If i is trying to compute a number for one of the other players, say player j, then he will check the players other than j and ask them what j reported to them in the first round. If all these agree, then he will use whatever number they agree on. If exactly one of the others disagrees, then i will compare what the others tell him j said to them with what j said to him on the first round. If all those agree, then again, i will use whatever number they agree on. In every other case, i uses the number 0 for j.
We explain momentarily how player i is going to use these computed messages to determine his action. At this point, we just want to make a simpler point. Suppose that each of the players is doing this same computation to choose messages for each player (i.e., asking for messages in the first round, receiving reports from the other players in the second about what they heard in the first round, then using (3) to compress this information into a single message). Pick a particular first round message for each of the players other than i, and suppose that each player sends this same message to each of the other players, then truthfully reports to each player in the second round what they heard in the first round. We refer to this as a truthful revelation strategy. Notice that truthful revelation imposes no restriction at all on how an agent chooses his first round message, only that he sends the same message to each of the other players in the first round, then truthfully reports what he heard in the second. Then we have the following Lemma:
Lemma 4. Suppose a set of n ≥ 4 players all use an identical confirmation process τ (·) with message space S, and that all players other than i are expected to follow truthful revelation strategies. Then whatever the realizations (s −i , t −i ) of the others' reports, τ
for each k, and j no matter what reports player i makes (be they truthful or not). Furthermore, Player i can follow a strategy that assigns any value in S to τ j i (s −j , t −j ) for j ∈ N , but otherwise he cannot affect τ j k (s −j , t −j ) for any k = i.
As is apparent from the construction in (3), the number τ i i (s −i , t −i ) is independent of any message that i sends. Other players use i's messages to determine the numbers they use for players other than i. However, if the others are using truthful reporting strategies, i can do nothing by deviating from the truthful reporting strategy, since his reports would then be ignored. We need n to be at least 4 in the construction because the uniqueness restriction (the left hand one in the first line of (3), and the right hand one in the second line) requires that a strict majority of players make the same report. Since player i communicates with n − 1 others, n − 1 has to be at least 3.
Proof. First, suppose all players do what they are supposed to, sending the same message to every other player on the first round, and truthfully reporting the messages they received. Suppose that i's report on the first round to every other player is s ′ . Then
because each of the others will send back the same report s ′ that they received from i in the first round. On the other hand, player j, hears the report s ′ from player i, and has each of the players other than i say that they heard s ′ as well. So τ j i (s −j , t −j ) = s ′ . On the other hand τ i k (s −i , t −i ) is computed from a reports ′ that k makes to i in the first round. Since k is expected to make that same report to each of the other players, t j ik =s ′ as well. So by the second line of (3), τ i k (s −i , t −i ) =s ′ . Player j is expected to receive the same reports ′ from player k that i did, since k is expected to send the same first round report to everyone. The others, including player i are expected to report to j that k sent them the reports ′ in the first round, so τ j k (s −j , t −j ) =s ′ . If i deviates and lies to the others on the second round, τ j k (s −j , t −j ) =s ′ , since by (3), i's unilaterally different report will be ignored.
Player i can also try to manipulate these numbers by sending different messages to the others in the first round, then lying about the reports he received when he makes his second round reports. Suppose i sends out 3 or more distinct messages in the first round. The others are expected to truthfully report these on the second round. Then
, which is based only on the second round reports of the others, must fail both conditions in the first line of (3), and τ i i (s −i , t −i ) = 0. Player j receives a first round report from i. Player i expects player j to hear truthful reports of the messages he sent to the others. Since i sent 3 or more distinct messages on the first round, there must be at least two distinct messages that player j receives from the others about i's report. Then from the second line of (3), τ j i (s −j , t −j ) = 0. These two conclusions will be true no matter what i reports to the others on the second round since neither of these numbers depends on i's second round reports. If k reportss ′ as above, τ j k (s −j , t −j ) =s ′ whether i lies on the second round or not.
Very similar arguments apply when i sends two distinct messages in the first round, say s ′ to all but one of the other players, and s ′′ to the other, say player k. Then using (3),
Player k reports that i told him s ′′ on the first round, but i reported s ′ to j and the others confirm that is what they heard. For the rest the arguments are as above.
4.4. Recommendation Mechanisms. Recommendation mechanisms are the nice idea provided by Yamashita (2010) . In his formulation, principals simply ask agents what they should do. If all the agents, or all but one of the agents, makes the same recommendation, the principle implements that action, otherwise, they take some default action. The idea is a nice generalization of the menu theorems from common agency. The principal simply offers agents a menu of options and has them jointly choose one. The term 'jointly choose' means essentially majority vote.
In our context there may or may not be agents, so players ask other players for recommendations or choices. These recommendations will instruct players how they should convert type reports and other messages into actions. Part of the mechanism that is recommended on the equilibrium path we describe will involve a confirmation process. The second part of a player's message will be his type report, and a message from the interval [0, 1] that will ultimately be used to correlate actions. In the second round, players will report the type reports and correlation messages that they received from other players Formally, a recommendation mechanism involves a message space consisting of two parts, a function space R i and a more standard measurable message space M i which we describe in more detail in a moment. The space R i is the set of all measurable mappings from
In words, if all but possibly one of the others make the same recommendation about how to translate the messages into actions, then the recommendation mechanism commits player i to carry out that common recommendation. Otherwise, the mechanism takes an arbitrary action.
The set R i is a set of mechanisms. We will have all players make the same recommendation on the equilibrium path. We are now able to prove our main theorem.
The Proof of the Main Theorem
Proof. The proof is constructive. Let q (θ) be the randomization that is to be supported when types are θ. Since the allocation rule is individually rational, there is a collection of punishments that ensure participation by each player. Let {p i (θ −i )} i∈N be the type contingent randomization that is to be carried out by the players other than i when i is being punished.
We first describe the recommendations we want players to make on the first round. This construction will explain both how the messages are used to implement a randomization with contracts that map into pure actions, and also how the two rounds of messages can be used to correlate actions without a public randomizing device while still satisfying the single-deviation perfection requirement.
Let τ be a confirmation process with message space S = Θ × [0, 1] involving the other n − 1 players. Write (θ, x) as a typical element of S.
The equilibrium path recommendation by other players to player i is given by
where α q i is the projection of the randomizing function for mixture q τ θ (s −i , t −i ) on the set A onto the set A i . The randomizing function is defined by (2) above.
When player k unilaterally deviates in the mechanism design stage and offers something other than a recommendation mechanism, the non-deviators will recommend
to each non-deviating player i, where (s −ik , t −ik ) is an array of messages from the other non-deviating players. In words, the non-deviators will recommend to each other the (projection of the) randomizing function associated with the punishment. In any history in which all players offer a recommendation mechanism, player i should truthfully report to each player k = j the message received from player j, should report his type truthfully to every other player and send every other player a correlating message x drawn uniformly from [0, 1] , and should recommend to player j that he should use the sequential communication mechanism based on a confirmation process r j (·, ·) as defined in (4) above. In any history in which a single player, say player k, has deviated and offered some mechanism other than a recommendation mechanism, player i should truthfully report the private message received from each player j = k to each player j ′ = k, j, should choose a correlating message s ′ using a uniform distribution on [0, 1] and should send that message along with his true type to all players other than k along with a recommendation to use the sequential communication mechanism r k j as defined in (5). Now we proceed to prove that the strategies specified constitute a Bayesian equilibrium by showing that no player alone can affect the allocation except by sending false information about his type. First, it is immediately a best reply for each player to offer a recommendation mechanism. The reason is that no matter which continuation equilibrium is played in response to the deviation, the deviator should expect the others to implement mixture p i (θ). As a consequence, i's payoff cannot exceed u i which is less than the payoff associated with the recommendation mechanism.
The rest of the argument is similar. Each player i should recommend that player j use the sequential communication mechanism based on a confirmation process r j (·, ·). The reason is that since there are at least 4 players in the game by assumption, there are at least two other players who are expected to recommend r j (·) to player j. So j is going to implement r j no matter what i recommends. As a result it is a best reply for i to recommend r j as well.
On the equilibrium path, all players offer recommendation mechanisms, and each player recommends {r j } j =i . The r j are sequential communication mechanisms based on a confirmation process, and other players are expected to use truthful reporting strategies when they participate in these mechanisms. By Lemma 4, each player's action is based on the same collection of numbers τ and signalx i that i chooses to send to the others on the first round
wherex has a uniform distribution on [0, 1] . Since this rule implements the incentive compatible rule q, player i has no incentive to misrepresent his type. It is also a best reply for player i to choose a signal uniformly from [0, 1].
Remarks.
Observe that this theorem by itself is not a characterization theorem. It simply shows that a large number of outcomes can be supported as equilibrium. Since we believe the point of the Yamashita argument is to motivate restrictions on the contracting environment, this may be all that matters. However, it is straightforward that the only allocation that can be supported as equilibrium outcomes in mechanisms are those that are incentive compatible and individually rational as we have defined them, provided the set of mechanisms includes the recommendation mechanisms we defined above. The reason is that these mechanisms allow a player to commit to a mechanism that makes his action a function of his correlating message. This effectively means that his payoff cannot fall below whatever he gets by choosing a best reply to whatever punishment the other players impose against this mechanism. However, that is exactly what the individual rationality condition describes. So in fact, incentive compatibility and individual rationality complete characterize the set of allocations supportable as equilibrium for any set of mechanisms that include recommendation mechanisms.
The model of competing mechanisms that is most often discussed in the literature has a number of uninformed mechanism designers competing to influence a number of privately informed agents who have no commitment ability. Here we have only players, all of who write contracts. So, for example, if there are two uninformed principals and two informed agents who control no actions, we rely on the agents verifying one anothers' correlating message. We also rely on each principal participating in the recommendation process. It is possible to rule out both the possibility that agents communicate with one another, and that principals participate in the recommendation process by requiring at least 3 agents (and 2 principals).
Another special case is worth remarking on. If there is only a single uninformed principal dealing with three informed agents who control no actions, our theorem still provides the set of supportable allocations. Even when the agents control no actions, they can still punish a deviating principal by coordinating on continuation play where their messages contain no useful information. This ensures that the individual rationality constraint we provide is still the correct one.
Provided all players can communicate with one another, our theorem simply requires four players. The one well known case that isn't covered is a simple common agency with two principals and one agent. This simple two principal common agency is the model that is used most widely to illustrate properties of competing mechanism equilibrium.
Refinements
Our theorem uses Bayesian equilibrium as a solution concept. We feel that it is beyond the scope of this paper to impose any further refinements. However, it may help in judging this, to explain some of the difficulties.
Initially, observe that equilibrium in recommendation mechanisms typically won't be part of any sequential equilibrium. For example, consider a problem in which there are two players A and B who each have two actions T and B, and two players who control no actions. If A and B both play T then they receive payoff 1, while the other two players receive payoff 0. In every other outcome, A and B receive payoff 0 while the other two players receive payoff 1. The outcome where A and B both take action T can be supported as an equilibrium in recommendation mechanisms. Every player recommends T to both A and B, and believes that recommending B is pointless because the recommendation will be ignored. This can't be part of any sequential equilibrium because if there is any probability at all that two of the other players recommend B (as will be the case with any totally mixed strategy), it is strictly better for the players other than A and B to recommend B. Voting with the majority as is done in recommendation mechanisms, is never strictly dominated, but it isn't uncommon in games that it is never a strict best reply, which makes it impossible to support sequential equilibrium.
There are weaker equilibrium refinements that don't rely on trembling hand arguments. However, there is a more fundamental problem which arises even in single principal mechanism design. It would be convenient to interpret the single principal problem as an incomplete information game in which the principal offers the agents a take it or leave it mechanism. Then the 'equilibrium' in which the principal offers his revenue maximizing mechanism is somehow focal. This interpretation if fine, provided the equilibrium concept is Bayesian equilibrium. Otherwise intractable problems emerge.To see why, consider a game with complete information. There are four players (simply so that the assumptions of our theorem above are satisfied). Suppose that player 1 has three possible actions, {a, b, c}. None of the other players controls any actions at all. Player 1 offers a mechanism, and the solution concept requires that after seeing the mechanism, continuation play constitutes a Nash equilibrium (subgame perfection). Obviously, player 1 simply chooses his favorite action in any Bayesian equilibrium. However, player 1 could deviate and offer a mechanism which invites players 2 and 3 to send a message in [0, 1] . He commits the translate the messages m 2 and m 3 into actions the following way: , Now imagine payoffs for player 2 areu (a) = −1, u (b) = 0, and u (c) = 1. Player 3's payoff is −u. This is simply the Sion Wolfe Sion and Wolfe (1957) example of a game that has no equilibrium in either pure or mixed strategies. This is a feasible mechanism in our framework, and a reasonable looking mechanism in any framework. So in this simple setting, there can be no subgame perfect equilibrium to the mechanism game unless mechanisms like the one above are ruled out. It is tempting to impose some naive assumption like 'mechanisms that don't have equilibria are ruled out', which simply moves the existence problem up one stage, since the set of feasible mechanisms is no longer (obviously) compact.
Restricting to games with a finite set of actions and requiring that message spaces be finite in all feasible mechanisms is a way to overcome this problem provided players are allowed to use mixed strategies. However, restricting to pure strategies immediately rules out refined equilibrium. The argument again is simply that principals can always deviate to mechanisms that do not have pure strategy equilibria. The offending mechanisms are a lot easier to find that the Sion-Wolfe example discussed above. Suppose player 1 has two actions a, and b. Player 2 strictly prefers a to b while player 3 strictly prefers b to a, but neither player has any actions of his own. The outcome is obvious -player 1 simply takes his favorite action.
This can't be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium in mechanisms. Player 1 can deviate to a mechanism with two messages m 1 , and m 2 . Players 2 and 3 are each asked to send one of these messages. If the messages agree, a is implemented, if they disagree b is implemented. Obviously, there is no pure strategy equilibrium for the message game between 2 and 3. Again, we mention this only to show that with most reasonable looking preferences, it is possible for player 1 to construct a mechanism for which no pure continuation equilibrium exists. This possibility is enough to rule out subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies in the mechanism design game.
If mixed strategies are allowed, then some randomized and even correlated mixtures are presumably supportable as 'perfect' equilibrium outcomes in the mechanism design game. However, no characterization theorem of this kind exists.
Conclusion
Our basic contribution is to complement the Yamashita theorem by characterizing the set of outcome functions supportable as Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the competing mechanism game. Whether or not there is a sensible equilibrium refinement for competing mechanism games that will narrow the of supportable outcomes is an open question.
